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THE ROLE OF UNITED STATES FEDERAL COURTS IN 
EXTRADITION MATTERS: THE RULE OF NON· 
INQUIRY, PREVENTIVE DETENTION, AND 
COMP ARATIVE LEGAL ANALYSIS 
Rachel A. Van Cleave' 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The recent efforts of Spain to extradite General Augusto Pinochet from 
England have coalesced and brought to the fore issues relating to extradi-
tion, international cooperation, and human rights. 1 The extradition request 
raises a rather familiar tension as to whether an extradition request is pri-
marily a political or a judicial matter.2 In addition, the decision by Britain's 
• Associate Professor of Law, Texas Tech University School of Law. B.A. Stan-
ford University, 1986; J.D. University of California, Hastings College of the Law, 1989; 
J.S.M. Stanford Law School, 1994. I presented an earlier version of this paper at the Law 
& Society Annual Meeting, "Making Connections Across Disciplines, Theories and Meth-
ods" (Aspen, Colorado, June 6-9, 1998), under the title, Extradition and the Practice of 
Preventive Detention Use of a Comparative Analysis Toward Greater Understanding. Ac-
cordingly, I thank Law & Society for the opportunity to crystallize my thoughts in a forum 
conducive to meaningful feedback. I am indebted to the following people for providing 
me with information and documentation on the Rovelli and Arnaboldi cases: M. Cherif 
Bassiouni, Laura A. Brevetti, Robert A. Culp and Sharon Kegerreis. I also thank William 
R. Casto and Robert E. Lutz, II for their insightful comments and suggestions on earlier 
drafts, my research assistants, Linda S. Eckols and Michael Holley for their invaluable 
help, and Joseph Schottland for editorial and other support. 
1. See Louis Begley, Many Ghosts, Much Guilt, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 12,1998, at A31 
(discussing bringing to justice Pinochet and others like him); Carroll Bogert, The Pinochet 
Precedent, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 2, 1998, at A27 (calling for the prosecution of Fidel Castro 
and Idi Amin as well as Pinochet); Marlise Simons, Spain Says It's Neutral on Pinochet; 
Signs are Otherwise, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 21,1998, at A12; Marlise Simons, Pinochet's Span-
ish Pursuer: Magistrate of Explosive Cases, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 19, 1998, at A1; Clifford 
Krauss, Britain Arrests Pinochet to Face Charges By Spain, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 18, 1998, at 
AI. 
2. After the initial decision by the House of Lords, Home Secretary Jack Straw had 
the discretion to deny Spain's extradition request. However, Straw stated that he followed 
the letter of the law and "consider[ed] this matter in strict accordance with the legal obli-
gations emplaced upon me . . .. I have decided to issue an authority to proceed in respect 
to the extradition of Senator Pinochet." Michael Goldfarb, All Things Considered (Na-
tional Public Radio Broadcast, Dec. 9, 1998, Transcript No. 98120912-212). Former Prime 
Minister Margaret Thatcher criticized Straw's decision stating, "[t]his was a political deci-
sion, and it represents a failure of political leadership." Warren Hodge, Briton Won't Free 
27 
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House of Lords illustrates the increasing importance of the question regard-
ing the extent to which a national court, ruling on an extradition request, 
should consider international law or the law of another country. On No-
vember 25, 1998, the House of Lords determined that Pinochet lacks abso-
lute immunity from arrest for actions taken while in office in Chile.3 Osten-
sibly, the case raised only the narrow issue of immunity.4 In the course of 
deciding whether or not Pinochet could claim immunity as a former Head of 
State, the House of Lords looked beyond the law effective within its borders 
and considered principles of customary international law. In addition to ex-
amining British law on immunity, the court applied the Diplomatic Privileges 
Act of 1964 to hold that immunity does apply to a former head of state.s 
Furthermore, the court relied on "normative principles of internationallaw,,6 
to determine that the crimes alleged against Pinochet-torture, genocide and 
hostage taking-fall beyond the scope of acts performed by a head of state 
which qualify for immunity.7 Finally, the court concluded that the English 
act of state doctrine, which counsels "courts of one state against questioning 
the validity or legality of official acts of another state,"S does not apply where 
it would "run counter to the state of customary internationallaw.,,9 In fact, 
the court quoted the Third Restatement of The Foreign Relations Law of 
the United States, concluding that the act of state doctrine should not apply 
where allegations of torture or genocide are involved since "international 
law of human" rights is well established and contemplates external scrutiny of 
such acts."tO Notably absent from the opinions which denied Pinochet's im-
munity claim was any mention of the effect of Chile's grant of amnesty to Pi-
nochet in 1988, implying that the court attached no weight to that act of 
Pinochet, Ruling the Case Can Proceed, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 10, 1998, at A3. 
3. See Regina v. Bartle, House of Lords, Session 1998-99, Publications on the Internet 
<http://www.parliament.the-stationary-office.co.uklpalld199899I1djudgmUjd981125/pino01 
.htm> (the full opinion is at nine links from the web site, and these are numbered pino01, 
pino02, etc., therefore, future reference is to the link number). 
4. This decision was overturned by another panel of the House of Lords because 
Lord Hoffman failed to disclose his ties to human rights groups such as Amnesty Interna-
tional. See Warren Hodge, Pinochet Wins a Round as the Law Lords Void a Ruling, N.Y. 
TIMES, Dec. 18, 1998, at A3. A different panel took up the case on January 18, 1999. See 
Warren Hodge, Law Lords in London Open Rehearing of Pinochet Case, N.Y. TIMES, 
Jan. 19, 1999, at A3. The seven-judge panel of the House of Lords decided on March 24, 
1999, that Pinochet is not immune from prosecution and therefore may be extradited to 
Spain. See Regina v. Bartle, Publications on the Internet, http://news.bbc.co.uklhilenglish 
/statidpinchecrulinglpinol.htm (House of Lords, Session 1998-99). The court, however, 
limited the number of charges for which Spain may try Pinochet. See id. 
5. See Bartle, pino09, supra note 3, at 4-5 (Lord Steyn). 
6. Id. at 7. 
7. See Bartle, pino08, supra note 3. 
8. Bartle, pinoOl, supra note 3 (quoting Oppenheim's INTERNATIONAL LAW 365 (9th 
ed.1992». 
9. Bartle, pino09, supra note 3. 
10. Id. 
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state.1I 
Just as the extradition case of Pinochet focused on the single question of 
immunity, yet raised broader concerns, so too does the scope of this article. 
My interest in the area of extradition arose out of a very narrow, yet in-
triguing comparative point regarding the extent to which a U.S. court should 
attempt to understand the criminal justice system of another country to de-
cide whether the requesting country had complied with a treaty requirement. 
An analysis of the requesting country's system, which I advocate, is not for 
the purpose of judging the other system, but rather, first on a practical level, 
of ensuring that the terms of an extradition treaty are complied with and, 
secondly, and more broadly, of educating federal courts on the criminal jus-
tice systems of other countries. 
Dinko Sakic,12 Leon Mugesera,13 Father Federico Marcos Cunha,14 Jo-
anne Chesimard,t5 and Ira Einhorn16 have been, like Pinochet, the subject of 
recent extradition requests seeking their return to the requesting country 
where they might face either a trial for the crimes charged or a prison sen-
tence for the crimes of which they had been convicted. By contrast, Felice 
Rovelli,t7 Jan Alf Assarsson,18 Reza Emami,19 Hans-Juergen Kaiser,20 and 
11. But see Bartle, pino07, supra note 3 (voting against extradition and citing two in-
vestigations of the Chilean amnesty and pointing out that there was no finding that the 
amnesties were contrary to international law). See Eugene Robinson, Pinochet's Influence 
Lingers-Successor Chafes Under Constitution Imposed by Chilean General, 
WASHINGTON POST, Sept. 13, 1990, at A25 (discussing the amnesty law passed by Pino-
chet barring prosecution of Pinochet and other military officers). 
12. Former Nazi who was the commander of the concentration camp, Jasenovac, 
where it is estimated that from 85,000 to 600,000 Jews, Serbs and Gypsies were murdered. 
See Guy Dinmore, Croatia Confronts Its Past as War Crimes Suspect Returns, WASH. 
POST, June 19, 1998, at A35. Sakic fled to Argentina after World War II and was extra-
dited to Croatia on June 19, 1998. See id. 
13. Top official of the former Hutu President Juvenal Habyarimana of Rwanda. See 
Ex-official of Rwanda is Ordered Deported, TORONTO STAR, July 12, 1996, at A9. 
Mugesera is accused of calling for the extermination of Tutsis in 1992 and is living in Can-
ada. See id. Mugesera was ordered deported on July 11, 1996. See id. 
14. Convicted for the murder of a 13-year-old boy. See Convicted Child-Killing Priest 
Flees Portugal, REUTERS LIMITED, Apr. 9, 1998. Cunha fled to Brazil upon being re-
leased to visit his mother. See id. 
15. Former leader of Black Panther Movement, convicted of murdering a New Jersey 
State Trooper, Chesimard escaped from prison and is now living in Havana, Cuba. See 
James Dao, Fugitive in Cuba Still Wounds- Trenton: Chesimard Unrepentant at Trooper's 
'73 Killing; Whitman is Irate, N.Y. DMES, May 1, 1998, at B3; see also Cuba Urged to Re-
turn Activist to U.S., CHI. TRIB., Apr. 3, 1998, at 13. 
16. Convicted in abstentia in Philadelphia in 1981 for the murder of Helen "Holly" 
Maddux, Einhorn is now living in France. See William Branigin, France Rejects Extradi-
tion for u.s. Killer; Ruling Outrages American Officials, WASH. POST, Dec. 5, 1997, at A3. 
17. See In re Extradition of Rovelli, 977 F.Supp. 566 (D. Conn. 1997) (holding that 
extraditee failed to show special circumstances necessary to overcome presumption 
against bail). 
18. See In re Extradition of Assarsson, 635 F.2d 1237 (7th Cir. 1980) (holding that the 
Court of Appeals in extradition cases may review only those conditions which preclude 
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Giovanni Arnabolde1 were each the subject of extradition requests by coun-
tries seeking to detain them, in the absence of pending charges, for investiga-
tory purposes. Unlike U.S. law, where an detained individual must be 
charged or released without delay,22 in a number of countries an individual 
may be detained for months and subsequently released without charges ever 
being filed. As to each of the individuals named in the second group above, 
the country requesting extradition has relied on an arrest warrant for this 
form of preventive detention23 to support the extradition request even 
extradition for offenses which are otherwise extraditible and any such conditions must 
come from the treaty itself}. 
19. See Emami v. United States District Court, 834 F.2d 1444 (9th Cir. 1987) (holding 
that the district court had jurisdiction to order physician's extradition for "detention for 
investigation" under extradition treaty between West Germany and the United States be-
cause the crimes with which the physician was charged were extraditible offenses). 
20. See Kaiser v. Rutherford, 827 F.Supp. 832 (D.D.C. 1993) (holding that a formal 
charging document was not required under the extradition treaty between the United 
States and the Federal Republic of Germany and that the defendant's extradition was not 
contrary to the doctrine of dual criminality). 
21. See In re Extradition of Arnaboldi, No. 95-2467 (S.D. Fla. 1995) (opinion unpub-
lished). 
22. See FED. R. CRIM. P. § 5(a) ("[A]n officer making an arrest ... shall take the ar-
rested person without unnecessary delay before the nearest available federal magistrate 
judge ... "); see also CAL. PENAL CODE § 825(a)(I) (West 1998) ("[T]he defendant shall 
in all cases be taken before the magistrate without unnecessary delay, and in any event, 
within forty-eight hours after his or her arrest, excluding Sundays and holidays"); see, e.g., 
McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332 (1943) (holding that a conviction resting on evi-
dence secured through flagrant disregard of the procedure which Congress has com-
manded cannot be allowed to stand without making the courts themselves accomplices in 
willful disobedience of law); United States v. Yong Bing-Gong, 594 F.Supp. 248 (N.D.N.Y. 
1984), affd, 788 F.2d 4 (1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 818 (1986) (holding 24-hour delay 
between arrest and arraignment was unreasonable). The arraignment formally notifies the 
defendant of the charges the prosecutor has filed and formally initiates the criminal pro-
ceeding. See RONALD J. ALLEN, ET AL., CONSTITIITIONAL CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: AN 
EXAMINATION OF THE FOURTH, FIFTH, AND SIXTH AMENDMENTS AND RELATED 
AREAS 16 (3d ed. 1995). 
23. The term preventive detention might also refer to the detention of a defendant 
without bail upon indictment, pending trial. See Bail Reform Act of 1984, 18 U.S.c. § 
3142(e) ("if ... the judicial officer finds that no condition ... will reasonably assure the 
appearance of the person ... and the safety of any other person and the community, [he] 
shall order the detention of the person before trial"); United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 
739 (1987) (upholding the Bail Reform Act); JEROLD H. ISRAEL, ET AL., CRIMINAL 
PROCEDURE AND THE CONSTITIITION: LEADING SUPREME COURT CASES AND 
INTRODUCTORY TEXT 470 (1988) ("the term 'preventive detention' is usually used to de-
scribe the pretrial detention of a defendant to protect society from the risk of criminal 
conduct by him pending disposition of the outstanding criminal charges"); Stanislaw 
Frankowski and Henry Luepke, Pre-Trial Detention in the U.S., in PREVENTIVE 
DETENTION: A COMPARATIVE AND INTERNATIONAL LAW PERSPECTIVE 53 (S. 
Frankowski & D. Shelton, eds. 1992). This term is also used to describe the provisional 
arrest and detention of an individual pending a decision by a country of whether to re-
quest the extradition of the person. See, e.g., 18 U.S.c. § 3187; Parretti v. United States, 
122 F.3d 758 (9th Cir. 1997) (finding that the provision in the U.S. extradition treaty with 
France allowing provisional arrest of someone "pending a possible request that the fugi-
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though the treaty with the United States provides only that persons charged 
or convicted with certain offenses are extraditable. This raises an important 
and interesting comparative point as to what the word charged means and at 
what point someone has been charged within different criminal justice sys-
tems. Rather than assay the significance of this point by engaging in a com-
parative analysis, U.S. courts side step the issue by relying on a doctrine 
which originally stated that guarantees contained in the U.S. Constitution 
did not apply beyond the borders of the United States-the rule of non-
inquiry.24 As this paper discusses, the rule of non-inquiry has developed into 
a rule under which federal courts restrain themselves from examining the 
criminal justice system of the requesting country when the person subject to 
the extradition request claims that the requesting country will not provide 
him with a fair trial, or that its officials will subject him to mistreatment. 
However, in the context of the specific issue discussed in this paper, that is, 
whether the relator has been charged, federal courts do not apply what I call 
a pure rule of non-inquiry. Rather, courts combine the rule of non-inquiry 
with a form of treaty interpretation that precludes an in-depth analysis of the 
requesting country's system. 
This paper argues that applying the rule of non-inquiry to the issue of 
whether the requested person has been charged is analytically incorrect 
where the relevant treaty defines as extraditable persons who have been 
charged or convicted of certain offenses, thus requiring a judicial determina-
tion as to whether the person requested has been charged as part of the ini-
tial inquiry into extraditability. By contrast, the rule of non-inquiry is typi-
cally used to reject arguments of persons who are otherwise extraditable. 
This issue has not received much analysis perhaps because federal courts are 
reluctant to look beyond an arrest warrant issued by a foreign judge for fear 
that they lack the knowledge needed to evaluate such an order. This paper 
argues several reasons why courts should consider whether the person to be 
extradited will face trial proceedings. In addition to this procedural analysis 
regarding at what point the rule of non-inquiry is applicable, this paper also 
stresses why it is necessary for U.S. federal judges to understand the criminal 
justice systems of other countries, and to engage in an analysis of such sys-
tems. 
This paper first discusses the importance of understanding the criminal 
justice systems of other countries to explain why, as a matter of general pol-
icy, the rule of non-inquiry should not apply. Next, this paper briefly out-
lines the extradition process and asserts that as a matter of method of analy-
tive be extradited" in violation of the Fourth Amendment), vacated, 143 F.3d 508 (9th 
Cir., 1998) (en banc) (appeal dismissed because Parretti fled the United States). This pa-
per examines the type of preventive detention described in the text which involves the ar-
rest and detention of a suspect where there is no prospect that the individual will neces-
sarily face charges and stand trial. 
24. See Neely v. Henkel, 180 U.S. 109 (1901), discussed infra notes 71-72 and accom-
panying text. 
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sis, the question of whether the relator has been charged for purposes of the 
extradition treaty must be answered as a first step in determining whether 
the relator is extraditable at all, thus before the rule of non-inquiry enters 
the analysis. The focus of this paper then shifts to the meaning of the word 
charged in extradition treaties, and whether, as a matter of treaty interpreta-
tion, that term includes one who is sought by a foreign country for the pur-
pose of preventive detention. The point of this paper is not necessarily to 
criticize the code provisions permitting preventive detention in certain coun-
tries,25 but rather to demonstrate that an order of preventive detention does 
not constitute a charge under U.S. extradition treaties, and further that U.S. 
federal courts should make an effort to examine the procedure of the re-
questing country to determine whether the requested person has been 
charged. Finally, this paper discusses some recent cases which indicate that 
federal courts might be beginning to seriously consider the issue raised in 
this paper. 
25. Arbitrary arrest and indefinite detention violate several international treaties, 
including Article 3 of The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, adopted on December 
10, 1948. See Helena Cook, Preventive Detention-International Standards and the Protec-
tion of the Individual, in PREVENTIVE DETENTION: A COMPARATIVE AND 
INTERNATIONAL LAW PERSPECTIVE 2 (S. Frankowski & D. Shelton, eds. 1992). In Italy, 
however, preventive detention is subject to judicial supervision and review on appeal. I do 
not claim that this type of preventive detention is violative of human rights, but rather that 
it is not the same as being charged with a crime because the person who is subject to the 
detention order does not necessarily face criminal proceedings. Nonetheless, there is 
some indication that preventive detention has been used to encourage suspects to help the 
government in its investigation. In any event, it would be rather hypocritical for a U.S. 
court to find preventive detention in other countries violative of human rights given the 
treatment of illegal aliens in the United States, for example. See Barrerra-Echavarria v. 
Rison, 44 F.3d 1441 (9th Cir. 1995) (when the native country of an excludable alien refuses 
to allow him to return, he may be detained even though he has not been convicted of a 
crime and is not awaiting a criminal trial); Cruz-Elias v. United States Att'y General, 870 
F.Supp. 692 (E.D. Va. 1994) (holding that the Attorney General has the authority to de-
tain indefinitely an excludable alien); Nwankwo v. Reno, 828 F. Supp. 171 (E.D.N.Y. 
1993) (alien who has served criminal sentence may continue to be detained pending de-
portation proceedings); Lance C. Pace, Barrera-Echavarria v. Rison: The Court Once 
Again Sees the Fiction and Ignores the Truth, 19 Hous. J. INT'L L. 533 (1997); Louis N. 
Schulze, Jr., The United States' Detention of Refugees: Evidence of the Senate's Flawed 
Ratification of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 23 NEW ENG. J. ON 
CRIM. & avo CONFINEMENT 641 (1997). See also Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346 
(1997) (upholding a Kansas Sexually Violent Predator statute which allows the civil com-
mitment of those who have served a full sentence for sexual crimes); Steven I. Friedland, 
On Treatment, Punishment, and the Civil Commitment of Sex Offenders, 70 U. COLO. L. 
REv. 73 (1999) (discussing the Hendricks decision); Jesse H. Choper, Uri and Caroline 
Bauer Memorial Lecture: On the Difference in Importance Between Supreme Court Doc-
trine and Actual Consequences: A Review of the Supreme Court's 1996-97 Term, 19 
CARDOZO L. REv. 2259, 2265 (1998) (discussing the Hendricks case). 
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II. THE IMPORTANCE OF UNDERSTANDING FOREIGN CRIMINAL JUSTICE 
SYSTEMS 
There is little doubt that crime has become globalized.26 The recent in-
dictment issued by a federal grand jury in Los Angeles, California charging 
twenty-six Mexican bankers and three Mexican banks with laundering drug 
money illustrates the relative ease with which individuals and illegal profits 
cross borders.27 This scheme allegedly involved banks in Mexico, Spain, and 
Venezuela, as well as south Florida trading companies, in money laundering 
by Colombia drug cartels.28 If nations are to fight such enterprises effec-
tively, cooperation is crucial, and extradition is one critical tool for facilitat-
ing multilateral cooperation. But cooperation among countries also requires 
a great degree of understanding of the different criminal justice systems. As 
the American criminal justice system increasingly comes into contact with 
foreign systems, it is important not only that U.S. representatives learn about 
the other systems in order to better negotiate, but also that U.S. courts simi-
larly acquire knowledge of legal systems and traditions29 different from that 
of the United States in order to implement accurately and effectively the re-
sults of multilateral cooperation. 
There are a number of additional purposes which are served by com-
parative law study. Aside from an academic theoretical30 purpose of better 
understanding law and constructing models,3! other purposes include gaining 
greater insight into the system under which one was trained.32 In addition, 
26. See M. CHERIF BASSIOUNI, INTERNATIONAL EXTRADITION: UNITED STATES 
LAW AND PRACTICE 628 (2d ed. 1987). See also Richard A. Martin, Cops Across Borders: 
The Internationalization of u.s. Criminal Law Enforcement, 18 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 368 
(1994) (citing several examples of criminal enterprises crossing multiple borders); Barbara 
Stewart, U.S. Enlists Russian Customs Agents to Spot Nuclear Smuggling, N.Y TIMES, 
Nov. 5, 1998, available in 1998 WL-NYf 9830900400 (international smuggling of nuclear 
weapons); Benjamin Weiser, U.S. Charges Bin Laden in Embassy Bombings, N.Y. TIMES, 
Nov. 5, 1998, available at 1998 WL-NYf 9830902200 (international terrorism); Thalif 
Deen, Drugs: Globalisation Aids Money Laundering, Warns U.N., INTER PREss SERVICE, 
May 12, 1998, available in 1998 WL 5987174 (international money laundering schemes). 
27. See Don Van NaUa, Jr., U.S. Indicts 26 Mexican Bankers in Laundering of Drug 
Funds, N.Y. TIMES, May 19, 1998, at A6. 
28. See U.S. Files First Money Laundering Civil Penalty Suit in Casablanca, ALERT 
GLOBAL MEDIA, Sept., 1998, vol. 9, No. 11, at 1; Sharon Harvey Rosenberg, Trading in 
Dirty Money, BROWARDDAILYBus. REv., July 31,1998, at B1. 
29. As to the use of the phrase "legal tradition," see JOHN HENRY MERRYMAN, THE 
CIVIL LAW 1'RADmoN: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE LEGAL SYSTEMS OF WESTERN 
EUROPE AND LATIN AMERICA 1 (2d ed. 1985). 
30. See Albin Eser, The Importance of Comparative Legal Research for the Develop-
ment of Criminal Sciences, in INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LAWS WORLD 
CONFERENCE: LAW IN MOTION 491, 498 (1997). 
31. See Mirjan Dama~ka, Structures of Authority and Comparative Criminal Proce-
dure, 84 YALE L.J. 480 (1974-75) (including a classic example of such model building). 
32. See William T. Pizzi, A Holistic Approach to Criminal Justice Scholarship, 79 
JUDICATURE 58 (1995) (suggesting that the study of other criminal justice systems might 
force American judges, lawyers, and scholars to consider the broader impact of the crea-
34 TEMPLE INT'L & COMPo L.J. [Vol. 13.1 
the study of foreign legal systems might provide ideas for reforming the na-
• 33 tlve system. 
Comparative study might also focus on "similarities among ... legal sys-
terns ... to find a common core of legal solutions and institutions.,,34 A re-
cent example are the discussions which took place during the spring and 
summer of 1998 on the creation of the permanent International Criminal 
Court which would have jurisdiction over crimes of genocide, crimes against 
humanity, and war crimes.35 Other efforts include the creation of the Inter-
national Criminal Tribunals for the Former Yugoslavia and Rwanda36 by the 
Security Council of the United Nations for the "prosecution of persons re-
sponsible for serious violations of international humanitarian law" commit-
ted in those countries.37 These types of coordination and cooperation proj-
ects have required individuals trained in countries of divergent legal 
traditions to reach agreements about joint procedures while ensuring protec-
tion of the rights of individuals so prosecuted.38 Similar efforts to harmonize 
different criminal justice systems on a regional level include those by the 
Council of Europe to harmonize the criminal justice systems of member 
tion of greater constitutional rights). 
33. See Rudolf B. Schlesinger, Comparative Criminal Procedure: A Plea for Utilizing 
Foreign Experience, 26 BUFF. L. REv. 361 (1976) (arguing for specific reforms of the U.S. 
criminal justice system based on aspects of European continental systems); see also Rich-
ard S. Frase & Thomas Weigend, German Criminal Justice as a Guide to American Law 
Reform: Similar Problems, Better Solutions?, 18 B.C. INT'L L.J. 317 (1995); Richard S. 
Frase, Comparative Criminal Justice as a Guide to American Law Reform: How the French 
Do It, How We Can Find Out, and Why Should We Care?, 78 CAL. L. REv. 542 (1990). 
34. Schlesinger, supra note 33, at 36I. 
35. See Gavin Hood, The Case for International Justice Poses Problems, THE 
LAWYER, Apr. 21, 1998, at 18, available in 1998 WL 9167167. For a history of the devel-
opment of the International Criminal Court, see M. Cherif Bassiouni, Historical Survey 
1919-1998, in STATUTE OF THE ICC: A HISTORICAL DOCUMENTARY (1998); M. Cherif 
Bassiouni, From Versailles to Rwanda in Seventy-Five Years: The Need to Establish a Per-
manent International Criminal Court, 10 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 11 (1997). 
36. The first verdict by this court was of Jean-Paul Akayesu, former Mayor of the 
central Rwandan town of Taba. See James C. McKinley, Jr., U.N. Tribunal Convicts 
Rwandan 0/,94 Genocide, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 3, 1998, at AI. Akayesu was convicted of the 
crime of genocide. See id.; see also War Criminals, Torturers and Mass Murderers Can Be 
Brought to Justice, THE ECONOMIST, Dec. 5, 1998, available in 1998 WL 11700842 (re-
porting that the Yugoslav tribunal has issued 21 indictments against 56 people, and has 
convicted and sentenced 5 defendants); Former Interahamwe Militia Chief Found Guilty of 
Genocide Charges, IRISH TIMES, Dec. 15, 1998, available in 1998 WL 24529721 (reporting 
this to be the third conviction by the Rwanadan Tribunal). 
37. Res. 808, U.N. SCOR (1993) reproduced in M. CHERIF BASSIOUNI, ET AL., 
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 759 (1996). 
38. See Kenneth Harris, Development of Rules of International Criminal Procedure 
Applicable to the International Adjudication Process: Arriving at a Body of Criminal Pro-
cedure Law for the ICC, Presentation at the International Institute of Higher Studies in 
Criminal Sciences, International Conference on Comparative Criminal Justice Systems: 
From Diversity to Rapprochement (Dec. 16-19, 1997) (hereinafter ISISC Conference) 
(manuscript available from author). 
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states, and specifically, to draft a European model penal code.39 Critical to 
such processes of coordination is an understanding of the different criminal 
justice systems. In furthering this understanding, the discussions regarding 
the International Criminal Court were very often enlightening. For example, 
comparative criminal justice experts were able to convince representatives of 
common law countries that a rule prohibiting the use of hearsay evidence 
was not critical to fairness in a non-jury system.40 Thus, comparative study in 
this context has a very practical educative purpose which is relevant to ex-
tradition law as well. Simply examining and understanding a foreign crimi-
nal justice system does not equate to criticizing, judging, or second-guessing 
it. Rather, study leads to understanding. Such understanding is increasingly 
important when judicial systems of different countries come into greater con-
tact with each other. 
Finally, and also related to the above purpose of furthering cooperation 
among nations, comparative study is necessary where a national court de-
termines that foreign law controls, as in a tort case, requiring the court to ex-
amine and apply the foreign law.41 This judicative comparative42 study is also 
relevant to extradition law, most notably under the principle of double 
criminality which requires that the crime for which the extraditee will be 
prosecuted is punishable in "both the demanding and the requested coun-
try.,,43 This requirement compels American judges who decide extradition 
requests to engage in an examination of the criminal law of the requesting 
country to determine whether the offense is also punishable under U.S. 
laws.44 
Similarly, an understanding of foreign criminal justice systems is impor-
tant to the narrow issue examined in this paper. Where an extradition treaty 
states that persons charged are extraditable, the issue is not resolved by sim-
ply translating the word charged. Rather, it is much more important to ex-
plain the concept and to put it into context.45 Furthermore, as the United 
39. See Joachim Hermann, Criminal Justice Policy and Comparativism-A European 
Perspective, presentation at the ISISC Conference (manuscript available from author). See 
also Albin Eser, supra note 30 at 497; Laurie L. Levinson, NAFTA: A Criminal Justice Im-
pact Report, 27 V.c. DAVIS L. REv. 843, 860-62 (1994) (discussing the potential for "cross-
pollination" of criminal justice laws under NAFf A). 
40. See Harris, supra note 38, at 4. 
41. For example, in Volkswagen v. Valdez, 909 S.W.2d 900 (Tex. 1995), the Texas 
Supreme Court examined German law to determine whether information sought in a dis-
covery request was protected under German privacy laws. The court held that it was an 
abuse of discretion for the trial court to reject any consideration of German law. Id. at 
903. See also Panama Processes v. Cities Service Co., 796 P.2d 276 (Okla. 1990) (applying 
Brazilian law in a breach of contract dispute). 
42. See Eser, supra note 30, at 498. 
43. See John G. Kester, Some Myths of United States Extradition Law, 76 GEO. L.J. 
1441, 1459 (1988). 
44. See Eser, supra note 30, at 499; BASSIOUNI, supra note 26 at 325. 
45. See, e.g., Christopher L. Blakesly, Comparative Law: Its Purposes and Possibili-
ties, 27 TEx. INT'L L.J. 315, 320-21 (1992) (describing the problem which arose in the Wil-
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States moves toward becoming involved in institutions like the International 
Criminal Court,46 federal courts will not be able to hide behind the rule of 
non-inquiry, but rather will have to make an effort to learn about different 
systems and traditions. Before examining the comparative point of when 
one is charged for extradition purposes, it is necessary to briefly discuss U.S. 
extradition law and practice. 
III. EXTRADITION LAW AND THE DOCfRlNE OF NON-INQUIRY IN THE 
UNITED STATES 
The extradition process, although not considered a criminal matter,47 in-
volves both the executive and judicial branches.48 A government seeking the 
extradition of an individual from the United States first submits a formal re-
quest to the State Department supported by the documentation required 
under the terms of the treaty.49 For example, the treaty with Italy sets out 
the typically required documents: a statement of the facts of the case, evi-
dence supporting a reasonable basis to believe that the person requested 
committed the crime, texts of the laws describing the elements of the offense, 
punishment and any applicable statute of limitations, and a copy of the arrest 
warrant.50 If approved by the State Department and the Justice Department, 
the request is forwarded to the relevant U.S. District Attorney, who then 
files a request with the local federal district court.51 This request is usually 
accompanied by a request for a warrant to arrest the person sought.52 Upon 
lie Holder extradition matter where the different meaning of the term "represent" had 
surprising results for the U.S. government). 
46. The United States has refused to sign the July 17 Rome Statute due to the un-
precedented broad scope of the court's jurisdiction. See Charles Trueheart, U.N. War 
Crimes Tribunal Limping Along, WASH. POST, Aug. 8, 1998, available at 1998 WL 
16548652; Gary Dempsey, Q: Is the Permanent War Crimes Tribunal Worthy of u.s. Sup-
port? No: This Boon to Managerial Elites Would Compromise U.S. Security and Civil Lib-
erties, INSIGHT MAG., Sept. 7, 1998, available at 1998 WL 9105767. 
47. See Romeo v. Roache, 820 F.2d 540, 543-33 (1st Cir. 1987) (extradition proceed-
ings are generally not considered criminal prosecutions); but see John G. Kester, Some 
Myths of United States Extradition Law, 76 GEO. L.J. 1441, 1446 (1988) ("The time is 
overdue to recognize the stakes in extradition hearings and to stop pretending that they 
are little more than squabbles over venue."). 
48. See BASSIOUNI, supra note 26, at 39 (listing the legislative branch as well because 
federal legislation "regulate[s] the procedures of extradition subject to the provisions of 
the relevant treaty"). 
49. See Jaques Semmelman, Federal Couns, the Constitution, and the Rule of Non-
Inquiry in International Extradition Proceedings, 76 CORNELL L. REv. 1198, 1201 (1991). 
50. See Treaty of Extradition between United States and Italy, Oct. 13, 1983, art. X, 
35 U.S.T. 3023. 
51. See Semmelman, supra note 49; BARBARA M. YARNOLD, INTERNATIONAL 
FuGITIVES: A NEW ROLE FOR THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE 21 (1991). 
52. See id. U.S. law, and most extradition treaties, allow for "provisional arrests" of a 
fugitive before a formal request for extradition has been made. See 18 U.S.C. § 3187; see 
also, e.g., Treaty of Extradition between the United States and Ireland, July 13, 1983, art. 
X, 35 U.S.T. 2523 (permitting the provisional arrest and detention of the requested person 
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arrest, the reiatorS3 initially appears before the magistrate or district judgeS4 
for a determination that the relator is the person named in the extradition 
request and whether he should be released on bail pending the extradition 
hearing.ss At the extradition hearing, the judge first determines whether the 
requirements for extradition have been satisfied. Such requirements include 
whether the offense charged is one for which the treaty permits extradition,s6 
that the offense satisfies the requirement of "dual or double crirninality,,,S7 
that the evidence supports a finding of probable cause that the relator com-
mitted the offense, and that any other treaty requirements are satisfied.s8 
Once the court has determined that these requirements are satisfied, the 
court may consider whether there are grounds for denying extradition, which 
are usually set out as exceptions in the treaty. Such exceptions include the 
political offense exception,s9 that the relator was tried in abstentia by the re-
questing country,60 or that the requesting country might impose the death 
penalty on the relator.61 The question of extraditability is separate from the 
issue of whether reasons otherwise exist for not extraditing the relator. 
Another exception which has been often argued, but which has not been 
successful, is that the demanding country will not treat the relator fairly. For 
for up to 45 days pending a request for extradition). 
53. The term relator describes the person who is the subject of the extradition re-
quest. 
54. See 18 U.S.c. § 3184 (providing that such proceedings are to be before "any jus-
tice or judge of the United States or any [U.S.] magistrate ... authorized ... by a court of 
the United States"). 
55. See BASSIOUNI ET AL., supra note 37, at W. Statutory law entitles the relator to 
a hearing. See 18 U.S.c. § 3184. 
56. See M. CHERIF BASSIOUNI, INTERNATIONAL EXTRADITION AND WORLD 
PuBLIC ORDER 312 (1974); BASSIOUNI ET AL., supra note 37, at 287. 
57. See BASSIOUNI, supra note 26, at 322. "This requirement means that the offense 
charged constitutes an offense in both [the requesting and demanding] legal systems." Id. 
58. See BASSIOUNI ET AL., supra note 37, at 287. 
59. See Quinn v. Robinson, 783 F.2d 776 (9th Cir. 1986) (rejecting an argument based 
on the political offense exception, but reviewing the history of the exception as well as the 
various approaches used to define the exception). 
60. See BASSIOUNI, supra note 26, at 443. This was the reason given by the French 
court for denying the U.S. request for extradition of Ira Einhorn. See supra note 5; see 
also Steven Levy, Getting Away With It: Ira Einhorn, NEWSWEEK, Dec. 15, 1997; John 
Lichfield, Hippy Escapes Extradition, THE INDEPENDENT (London), Dec. 5, 1997. 
61. See BASSIOUNI; supra note 56, at 459; see also BASSIOUNI, supra note 26, at 491-
93; Paul Holmes, Italian Death Penalty Ruling Hailed as Landmark, REUTERS NORTH 
AMERICAN WIRE, June 27, 1996. Italy denied a request by the United States to extradite 
Pietro Venezia because Venezia faced capital murder charges in the state of Florida, de-
spite assurances by Florida prosecutors that they would not seek the death penalty against 
Venezia. See id. But see Roger Cohen, Germany Sends Embassy Terror Suspect to U.S., 
N.Y. nMES, Dec. 21, 1998, at A7. Germany agreed to extradite Mamdouh Mahmud Sa-
lim, suspected of involvement with the Embassy bombings in Kenya and Tanzania, on the 
condition that U.S. prosecutors guarantee that Salim would not face the death penalty. 
See id. 
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example, in Ahmad v. Wigen,62 the relator argued that the demanding coun-
try, Israel, would subject him to torture and cruel and unusual punishment. 
The district court conducted an extensive hearing on this allegation which 
the court justified as necessary to ensure that "[t]he [U.S.] courts may not be 
parties to abusive judicial practices, even where sensitive foreign relations 
matters are concerned.,,63 The court ultimately determined that the relator 
had not shown by clear and convincing evidence64 that he would be subject to 
such procedures or treatment as to shock the conscience65 of an American 
jurist.66 On appeal, the Second Circuit affirmed the granting of extradition, 
but sharply criticized the district court for taking testimony and receiving ex-
tensive documentation on Israel's procedures and treatment of prisoners. 
"This, we think, was improper. The interests of international comity are ill-
served by requiring a foreign nation ... to satisfy a United States district 
judge concerning the fairness of its laws and the manner in which they are 
enforced.,,67 Rather, the court held, "[i]t is the function of the Secretary of 
State to determine whether extradition should be denied on humanitarian 
grounds.,,68 Thus, the court concluded that the rule of non-inquiry precluded 
judicial examination of another country's criminal justice system.69 The point 
of this article is not to contend that preventive detention of the relator by the 
requesting country is in a category with torture or murder. Nor is it to agree 
with the application of the rule of non-inquiry in cases such as Ahmad.70 
Rather, the purpose here is to show that the rule of non-inquiry is inapplica-
ble to a determination of whether the relator has been charged. 
Justice Harlan initially formulated the rule of non-inquiry in 1901 as a 
conclusion that the guarantees of the U.S. Constitution "have no relation to 
crimes committed without the jurisdiction of the United States against the 
laws of a foreign country."n In Neely, the Supreme Court rejected a U.S. 
62. 726 F.Supp. 389 (E.D.N.Y. 1989), affd, 910. F.2d 1063 (2d Cir. 1990). 
63. 726 F.Supp. at 412. 
64. See id. at 416. 
65. See id. at 411. 
66. See id. at 420. 
67. Ahmad, 910 F.2d at 1067. 
68. Id. 
69. See also In re Singh, 123 F.R.D. 127, 127 (D.N.J. 1987) (following the Ahmad de-
cision and refusing to consider the claim that the relators would "face torture and/or mur-
der upon their return to India"); Lauren Sara Wolfe, Gill & Sandhu v. Imundi: Due Proc-
ess and Judicial Inquiry into Potential Mistreatment of Extraditees by Requesting Countries, 
13 LoY. L.A. INT'L & COMPo L.J. 1009 (1991) (discussing cases applying non-inquiry 
where relator argues that he will be subject to mistreatment by the requesting country). 
70. There are several articles which criticize the rule of non-inquiry. See Richard J. 
Wilson, Using International Human Rights Law and Machinery in Defending Borderless 
Crime Cases, 20 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 1606 (1997); Mark Andrew Sherman, Representing 
Defendants in International Criminal Cases: Assening Human Rights Violations and Other 
Defenses: Indirect Incorporation of Human Rights Treaty Provisions in Criminal Cases in 
United States Courts, 3 ILSA J. INT'L & COMPo L. 719 (1997); Wolfe, supra note 69. 
71. Neely v. Henkel, 180 U.S. 109, 122 (1901). 
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citizen's argument that the statute under which he was to be extradited to 
Cuba did not secure rights attributed to criminal defendants under the U.S. 
Constitution. The court stated that U.S. citizenship did not entitle the rela-
tor "to demand, ofright, a trial in any other mode than that allowed to [the] 
people [of] the country whose laws [the relator] has violated and from whose 
justice he has fled."n Courts rely on this rule to dismiss arguments by the re-
quested person, who is otherwise extraditable, that the procedures of the re-
questing country violate the U.S. Constitution. The rule of non-inquiry is 
based in part upon the rationale that "[i]t is not the business of [U.S.] courts 
to assume responsibility for supervising the integrity of the judicial system of 
another sovereign nation.,,73 Ten years after Neely, in Glucksman v. 
Henkel,74 the Court rejected the relator's claim that the extradition request 
from Russia did not adequately identify the relator as the person sought. 
Justice Holmes concluded that as long as "there is presented, even in some-
what untechnical form according to our ideas, such reasonable ground to 
suppose [the relator] gUilty as to make it proper that he should be tried, good 
faith to the demanding government requires his surrender.,,75 This statement 
essentially set out the requirement of probable cause, now well established.76 
However, Justice Holmes then added the following dicta, "[w]e are bound by 
the existence of an extradition treaty to assume that the trial will be fair,,,n 
even though there is nothing in the opinion to indicate a specific challenge to 
the criminal justice system in Russia. In 1960, this conclusion was reaffirmed 
in Gallina v. Fraser.78 The court in Gallina emphasized that there was no 
precedent "indicating that the foreign proceedings must conform to Ameri-
can concepts of due process.,,79 Furthermore, the court held that any condi-
tions placed on extradition, such as retrial, "are to be determined solely by 
the non-judicial branches of the Government."so Though not expressly 
naming the rule of non-inquiry, the court in Gallina relied on a separation of 
powers rationale when it found itself restrained to apply the terms of the 
treaty,81 which allowed extradition of one who had been convicted in absten-
tia, and left any possible assurances of retrial to the discretion of the execu-
tive branch. In Gallina, however, the court stated that situations may exist 
"where the relator, upon extradition, would be subject to procedures or 
72. Id. at 123. 
73. Jhirad v. Ferrandina, 536 F.2d 478, 484-85 (2d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 833 
(1976). 
74. 221 U.S. 508 (1911). 
75. Id. at 512. 
76. See BASSIOUNI, supra note 26, at 552-56. 
77. 221 U.S. at 512. 
78. 278 F.2d 77 (2d Cir. 1960) (approving extradition of relator who had been con-
victed in absentia in Italy). 
79. Id. at 78. 
80. Id. 
81. See Factor v. Laubenheimer, 290 U.S. 276, 287 (1933) ("the right of international 
extradition is solely a creature of treaty"). 
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punishment so antipathetic to a federal court's sense of decency as to require 
a reexamination of the principle [of non-inquiry].,,82 Thus, the court indi-
cated that the rule of non-inquiry is not an absolute rule.83 
More recently, the rationale for the rule of non-inquiry has been bol-
stered by both the principle of comity, as expressed by the Second Circuit in 
Ahmed,84 as well as the political question doctrine which holds that the ques-
tion of whether to extradite is inherently political and therefore must be left 
to the executive branch.8S Thus, where the executive branch has entered into 
an extradition treaty with a particular country, that branch is presumed to 
have studied the country's criminal justice system and determined that it is 
sufficiently fair to permit extradition of individuals to that country, gener-
ally.86 The rule also extends to individual questions of extradition where the 
expectation is that if the Departments of State and Justice are concerned 
about the procedures of the requesting nation, they will "shy away from pre-
senting extradition requests from such regimes.,,87 Thus, individuals must 
look to the executive branch, rather than to the judiciary, for protection from 
unfair treatment by the demanding country. These justifications for the non-
inquiry rule are weak. What began as a rule that protections under the U.S. 
Constitution do not extend beyond U.S. borders has become a doctrine 
which asks federal courts to decline to try to understand the criminal justice 
system of another country. Comity is not threatened when U.S. courts at-
tempt to comprehend aspects of a foreign country's system; such an inquiry 
does not threaten the sovereignty of the other country. Furthermore, the 
State Department's priority is conducting the nation's foreign policy, not 
protecting the rights of one who is the subject of an extradition request. 
Given this clear conflict of interest, the federal courts serve as an important 
check on the executive branch's power to extradite.88 
82. Id. at 79. 
83. See In re Singh, 123 F.R.D. 127, 132 (D.N.I. 1987) ("This dictum [from Gallina] 
must be understood not as a command to depart from the doctrine of noninquiry but, in-
stead, as a suggestion that, under some situations, the doctrine might be reexamined."). 
84. See supra notes 62-68 and accompanying text. 
85. See Wacker v. Bisson, 348 F.2d 602, 606 (5th Cir. 1965) ("review by habeas cor-
pus ... tests only the legality of the extradition proceedings; the question of the wisdom of 
extradition remains for the executive branch to decide"); Ahmed, 910 F.2d at 1067. 
86. See Ahmed v. Wigen, 726 F.Supp. 389,411 (E.D.N.Y. 1989). See also Semmel-
man, supra note 49, at 1236-38. But see Richard I. Wilson, supra note 70, at 1619-28 (criti-
cizing the rule of non-inquiry where the practices of the requesting country violate inter-
national human rights law). 
87. Kester, supra note 47, at 1480. 
88. A separation of powers analysis is beyond the scope of this article. However, 
there have been recent challenges to the extradition statute arguing a separation of powers 
violation. See DeSilva v. DiLeonardi, 125 F.3d 1110 (7th Cir. 1997) (rejecting argument 
that extradition statutory provision § 3184, which allows the Secretary of State to review 
and set aside a judicial determination of extraditability, is unconstitutional.) Argument 
was not raised in the original extradition proceeding. See id. See Lobue v. Christopher, 
893 F.Supp. 65, 70 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (finding § 3184 unconstitutional because it "confer[s] 
1999] U.S. FEDERAL COURTS IN EXTRADITION MATTERS 41 
In addition to situations where the relator seeks to show that the re-
questing country's procedures are unfair or violate U.S. Constitutional no-
tions of due process, courts use the rule of non-inquiry to reject arguments 
which seek to expand exceptions to extradition already provided for in the 
treaty. The following examples illustrate this use of non-inquiry and support 
the argument that analysis of extraditability under the terms of the treaty 
precedes that of non-inquiry. In Kamrin v. United States,89 the treaty pro-
vided that extradition is not permitted where the offense is time barred un-
der the laws of the requesting country, Australia. Nonetheless, the relator 
argued that the crime charged by the Australian court was barred by the 
statute of limitations under U.S. law, though it was not time barred in Aus-
tralia. Relying on the language of the treaty, which precluded extradition if 
the offense was time barred under the law of the requesting country, the 
court refused to accept the relator's argument. The court addressed the rule 
of non-inquiry only because the relator made the broader argument that the 
court should not extradite where trial of the offense would violate U.S. law. 
Similarly, in In re Extradition of Ryan ,90 the court rejected a double jeopardy 
argument of the relator, relying on the language of the treaty. The treaty 
provided that extradition was prohibited if the relator had been convicted or 
acquitted by the requested country for the same crime for which extradition 
is sought. In Ryan, the relator had not been convicted or acquitted in the 
United States for the crimes for which her extradition was sought. Rather, 
she argued that her prosecution in Austria for the same crimes precluded ex-
tradition to Germany. The court first looked to the language of the treaty to 
upon the Secretary of State the authority to review the legal determinations of extradition 
judges"), vacated 82 F.3d 1081 (lack of jurisdiction to decide the issue). For discussions of 
these cases, see Allison Marston, Innocents Abroad: An Analysis of the Constitutionality of 
the International Extradition Statute, 33 STAN. J. INT'L L. 343 (1997); Catherine N. 
O'Donnell, The Unconstitutionality of the U.S. Extradition Statute, 23 NEW ENG. J. ON 
CRIM. & av. CONFINEMENT 497 (1997). 
The dual rationales of comity and separation of powers which support the rule of non-
inquiry also underlie the act of state doctrine, another rule by which the judiciary restrains 
itself in the area of international law. The act of state doctrine, also beyond the scope of 
this article, "precludes United States federal courts from adjudicating the public acts a 
recognized foreign sovereign power commits within its own territory." RESTATEMENT 
(THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 443 (1987). Just 
as the rule of non-inquiry has been criticized for violating separation of powers, so too has 
the doctrine of act of state. See Michael J. Bazyler, Abolishing the Act of State Doctrine 
134 U. PENN. L. REv. 325 (1986); Carol Hamilton Jordan, International Law-Act of State 
Doctrine- Blind Application of the Act of State Doctrine Precludes Judicial Review, 10 
SUFFOLK TRANSNAT'L L.J. 319 (1986). As to judicial deference generally in matters of 
international law, see Richard B. Lillich, The Proper Role of Domestic Courts in the Inter-
national Legal Order, 11 VA. J. INT'L L. 9, 22-23 (1970). Judicial abdication to the De-
partment of State has "lessened the stature of United States domestic courts in the inter-
national community by requiring them to act in sovereign immunity cases as virtual arms 
of the executive branch of the government." Id. 
89. 725 F.2d 1225 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 817 (1984). 
90. 360 F. Supp. 270 (E.D.N.Y.), affd, 478 F.2d 1397 (2d Cir. 1973). 
42 TEMPLE INT'L & COMPo L.J. [Vol. 13.1 
find that it did not preclude extradition to Germany where the relator may 
have been prosecuted in another country. The court then applied the rule of 
non-inquiry to reject the more general argument that prosecution in Ger-
many would violate the U.S. constitutional protection against double jeop-
ardy since she had been prosecuted in Austria for what she claimed were the 
same crimes. In both of these cases, the court first looked to the language of 
the treaty to determine whether its requirements had been satisfied for the 
extradition of the relator. These cases support the argument that the analy-
sis of extradition is two-pronged. First, the federal judge determines 
whether the person is extraditable under the terms of the treaty and, if the 
person is found to be extraditable, then the court considers arguments that 
the request should nonetheless be denied. It is only during the second phase 
that the doctrine of non-inquiry is relevant. The question of whether the 
person requested has been charged is within the first step of the analysis. 91 
Consequently, the non-inquiry rule does not affect this issue. However, U.S. 
courts have relied on non-inquiry when rejecting arguments opposing extra-
dition based on the absence of a charge. 
IV. THE QUESTION OF CHARGED AND THE USE OF PREVENTIVE 
DETENTION 
This section focuses on the meaning of the word charged in extradition 
treaties and illustrates how federal courts have folded non-inquiry into an 
analysis of how to interpret the relevant treaty. The extradition treaty be-
tween the United States and Italy contains language common to that found 
in other extradition treaties. The treaty provides that "[t]he Contracting 
Parties agree to extradite to each other, pursuant to the provisions of this 
Treaty, persons whom the authorities of the Requesting Party have charged 
with or found guilty of an extraditable offense.,,92 The treaty requires that 
the relator have been charged by the requesting country. This is not merely 
a technical question, nor one based on semantics. 93 The issue can have sig-
91. See In re Extradition of Moglia, 813 F.Supp. 1438 (D. Haw. 1993), which lists the 
following requirements for extradition: 
(1) that there is an extradition treaty in force between the Urnted States and Italy; 
(2) that Italy has "charged" Moglia with one or more crimes (see article I of the treaty); 
(3) that a certified copy of the arrest warrant or any order having similar effect has been pre-
sented to this court ... ; 
(4) that the crimes for which he is charged are extraditable offenses within the terms of the 
treaty ... ; 
(5) that the evidence submitted established a reasonable basis to believe that Moglia commit-
ted the charged offenses ... ; and 
(6) that the individual before the court is the same person who is charged in Italy. 
[d., at 1439-40 (citations omitted) (emphasis added). 
92. Treaty of Extradition between United States and Italy, Oct. 13, 1983, art. I, U.S.-
Italy, 35 U.S.T. 3023 (emphasis added). 
93. See In re Assarsson, 635 F.2d 1237, 1243 (7th Cir. 1980) (dismissing relator's ar-
gument regarding the lack of a charge as one "based on semantics, not substance"). 
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nificant consequences for the person who is the subject of an extradition re-
quest. Where the requesting country seeks the extradition of a person to de-
tain him for investigatory purposes, pursuant to an order for preventive de-
tention, the relator faces the uncertain prospect of being held in a jail of the 
requesting country for months, not knowing whether he will ultimately be 
charged and stand trial, or simply be released.94 Such a situation is quite dif-
ferent from being extradited to another country while facing charges upon 
which the government will have to present evidence pursuant to the proce-
dures of the demanding country. However, despite the language of the 
treaty, and the important differences between being charged and being de-
tained for investigatory purposes, U.S federal courts have rejected such ar-
guments. When confronted with this issue, courts tend to treat it as a matter 
of treaty interpretation, which certainly is involved. However, in the process 
of interpreting the treaty, the courts express a reluctance to examine the 
criminal justice system of the requesting country for the purpose of deter-
mining whether the request satisfies the term charged as interpreted by the 
court. 
The first reported case to examine the significance of charged under a 
treaty provision similar to the treaty with Italy is In re Assarsson.95 In As-
sarsson, a Swedish court, pursuant to a petition filed by the prosecutor, is-
sued a warrant to arrest Assarsson for suspicion on good grounds of commit-
ting gross arson, attempted gross fraud, and gross fraud. 96 This arrest 
warrant was then used to support a request for Assarsson's extradition under 
the U.S. treaty with Sweden. The applicable version of the extradition treaty 
provided that each country is to extradite "persons... who have been 
charged.,,97 Assarsson argued that the arrest warrant did not satisfy the re-
quirement that he be charged under the treaty because, under Swedish law, 
criminal proceedings begin with the issuance of a summons. The Seventh 
94. For example, under Italian law a suspect may be held under an order for preven-
tive detention for a period of time ranging from three months to one year, depending upon 
the punishment prescribed for the suspected offense, without the filing of charges. See 
Codice di Procedura Penale [C.P.P.] (Italy) art. 303(1)(a). 
Another concern raised by the absence of "formal" charges relates to the "principle of 
speciality which holds that the requesting state may prosecute or punish the relator only 
for the crime for which extradition is granted." BASSIOUNI, supra note 26, at 551. Where 
the requesting country has not duly charged the relator, and the United States extradites 
the relator anyway, there is a possibility that the requesting country will punish the relator 
for an offense for which the federal court might not have granted extradition. See id. at 
552. 
95. 635 F.2d 1237 (7th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 938. 
96. See id. at 1238. 
97. See Report on Supplementary Convention on Extradition with Sweden, Senate 
Comm. on Foreign Relations, S. Ex. Rept. No. 98-27, 98th Cong., 2d Sess., at 3 (1984) (set-
ting out language of prior treaty which was replaced with "persons ... who are sought for 
the purpose of prosecution"). Supplementary Convention of Extradition Between the 
United States and Sweden, Mar. 14, 1983, art. I, 35 U.S.T. 2501. For a discussion of this 
amendment, see infra notes 116-17 and accompanying text. 
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Circuit rejected this argument, stating that the treaty did not include a re-
quirement that the requesting country file formal charges against the person 
requested.98 The court concluded that the language in the first article of the 
treaty did not create such a requirement. Rather, the court stated, this use of 
the word charged intended in a "generic sense only to indicate 'accused.",99 
In response to the relator's argument that his extradition based on the arrest 
warrant would, in effect, permit extradition on mere suspicion, the court 
stated that regardless of the basis of the arrest warrant, extradition required 
a finding of probable cause by the extradition magistrate.loo The opinion in 
Assarsson does not indicate that the relator was sought for preventive deten-
tion or questioning purposes, but implies that as long as there is probable 
cause to believe that the relator committed an extraditable offense, it is sim-
ply not relevant whether the relator, upon being sent to the requesting coun-
try, faces pending charges upon which he will stand trial, or whether he will 
be detained in the absence of charges. The rule of non-inquiry does not pre-
clude such a consideration of the procedures of another country. Yet the 
court in Assarsson refused to consider the effect of the documentation sub-
mitted by Sweden, under Swedish law. 
While the court in Assarsson did not expressly invoke the rule of non-
inquiry, it relied on concerns which mirror the reasoning underlying this rule. 
The court stated that its "refusal to review compliance with foreign criminal 
procedure is ... based on respect for the sovereignty of other nations."IOJ 
Yet, the analysis raised by Assarsson's argument did not require the court to 
determine whether the Swedish court had compiled with its own law, but 
whether the defendant had been charged for purposes of the treaty. The 
court also reasoned that it was "not expected to become [an] expert in the 
laws of foreign nations."I02 This concern is also misplaced, and perhaps dis-
98. See 635 F.2d at 1242. 
99. ld. One commentator has noted that the term accused is used in other extradition 
treaties, indicating a difference between being accused and being charged. See 
BASSIOUNI, supra note 26, at 551 citing the Israel-Sweden Extradition Treaty, 516 
U.N.T.S. 3, and the United Kingdom-Sweden Extradition Treaty, 390 U.N.T.S. 118, stating 
that the relator must be "accused or convicted." Indeed, most of the extradition treaties 
entered into by the United States with other countries use the term charged. However, 
the fact that differences exist should lead one to conclude that there is some significant 
difference between charged and other terminology. For example, the treaty between the 
United States and Spain provides that the parties "agree to extradite to each other for 
prosecution or to undergo sentence persons sought for extraditable offences." Treaty of 
Extradition between United States and Spain, 1988, art. I, U.S.T. (emphasis added). See 
also Treaty on Extradition Between The United States and Japan, Mar. 3, 1978, art. I, 31 
U.S.T. 894 (each party agrees to extradite those "sought by the other Party for prosecu-
tion, for trial, or to execute punishment") (emphasis added); Treaty of Extradition Be-
tween the United States and Barbados, et ai., Dec. 22, 1931, art. I, U.S.T. (each party 
agrees to extradite "those persons who, being accused or convicted") (emphasis added). 
100. See 635 F.2d at 1243-44. 
101. ld. at 1244. 
102. ld. 
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ingenuous, since there are several situations in which U.S. courts must decide 
applications of foreign law,l03 even in the context of extradition.I04 
Interestingly, in the extradition matter of Assarsson's brother, In re Ex-
tradition of Assarsson,l05 the Eighth Circuit relied on the Seventh Circuit's 
conclusion regarding the issue of whether the relator had been charged un-
der Swedish law.106 The Eighth Circuit did examine Swedish criminal proce-
dure, however, when it considered the relator's argument that the federal 
statute of limitations barred extradition. I07 Federal law bars prosecution 
"unless the indictment is found or the information is instituted within five 
years next after such offense shall have been committed. ,,108 In a footnote, 
the court acknowledged that "[t]he Swedish authorities have not obtained a 
summons against [the relator]. Criminal prosecutions in Sweden begin with 
the filing of a 'summons.",I09 The lack of a summons was precisely what the 
relator claimed failed to satisfy the treaty requirement that he be charged.l1O 
The government argued that the Eighth Circuit should have found that the 
statute of limitations was tolled by the Swedish arrest order.111 The court re-
jected this argument, noting that "arrest does not toll the running of the stat-
ute of limitations.,,112 The court managed to avoid an inconsistent ruling 
which, on the one hand found that the relator had been charged even though 
the document did not constitute a formal charge, and on the other hand 
found that the charges, though not formal, nonetheless tolled the statute of 
limitations. The court upheld the district court's determination that the rela-
tor was a fugitive and therefore the issue of whether criminal proceedings 
had been initiated was irrelevant. ll3 This is another example of U.S. courts 
attempting to understand another country's criminal justice system. It is in-
teresting that in the same opinion the court refused to examine the criminal 
103. See supra note 41 and accompanying text. 
104. For example, the requirement of dual or double criminality is "[a] common re-
quirement for extradition ... that the acts which form the basis for the extradition request 
constitute a crime under the law of both the requesting and the requested States." Act 
Charged, A Crime in Both Countries, 6 WHITEMAN DIGEST 13, at 773. 
105. 687 F.2d 1157 (8th Cir. 1982). 
106. See id. at 1159-60. 
107. Unlike the treaty involved in the Kamrin case (see supra note 89 and accompa-
nying text), the treaty with Sweden provides that "[extradition] shall not be granted ... 
when the legal proceedings ... has become barred by limitation according to the laws of 
either the requesting state or the requested state." Treaty of Extradition between the 
United States and Sweden, Oct. 24, 1961, U.S.-Sweden, art. V, para. 2, 14 U.S.T. 1845, 
1849 (emphasis added). 
108. 18 U.S.c. § 3282. 
109. 687 F.2d at 1161, n.7. 
110. See id. at 1159. 
111. See id. at 1161, n.8. 
112. [d. 
113. See id. at 1162-63, n.ll. Specifically, the court held that the relator left Sweden 
with the intent to avoid arrest or prosecution, and that such departure "tolled the running 
of the statute of limitations." [d. at 1162. 
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justice system as to one issue, yet looked at the same aspect of the system 
with respect to another. 
There has been very little scholarly attention devoted to the analysis of 
charge in Assarsson,1I4 and most of the case law simply follows its reasoning 
without analysis. ll5 The response of the executive branch and the Senate is 
of greater significance. After the Assarsson case, Sweden and the United 
States negotiated a supplement to the extradition treaty which changed the 
wording of Article I of the treaty to create an obligation to extradite "those 
persons ... who are sought for the purpose of prosecution."l\6 The report on 
this change indicates that it was intended to clarify that a Swedish arrest war-
rant is the requisite charging document. ll7 This is important for three rea-
sons. First, the language chosen to avoid the perceived problem of what 
constitutes a charging instrument under Swedish law focuses on whether the 
person is sought for prosecution purposes, in contrast to investigatory pur-
poses or preventive detention purposes. This indicates that the word 
charged is not meant as a generic concept that includes someone who has 
been accused or is under suspicion, contrary to the conclusion of the Assars-
son court. liS Second, the statement in the Senate Report quoted above indi-
cates that in ratifying the supplement to the treaty, the Senate intended as a 
requirement for extradition that the subject of the request be formally 
charged by the requesting country, and not merely under suspicion or 
wanted for questioning. Finally, it is significant that despite the granting of 
Assarsson's extradition by the Seventh Circuit, the Executive Branch and 
the Senate perceived a need to clarify the treaty, implying a lack of confi-
dence in the court's analysis in Assarsson. This further indicates an ac-
knowledgment of the difference between being charged and being sought for 
preventive detention or investigatory purposes. 
A recent extradition request submitted to the United States by Italy is 
illustrative of these concerns of treaty interpretation and the use of preven-
114. See John T. Soma, et aI., Transnational Extradition for Computer Crimes: Are 
New Treaties and Laws Needed?, 34 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 317, 332 n.86 (citing Assarsson 
as an example of how even the minimal requirements of the extradition treaty are not con-
sistently satisfied); John Francis Stephens, The Denaturalization and Extradition of Ivan 
the Terrible, 26 RUTGERS L.J. 821, 841 n.125 (characterizing the decision in Assarsson as 
questionable); Kester, supra note 43, at 1446 n.29 (characterizing the decision in Assarsson 
as questionable). Greater analysis of the Assarsson case is found in BASSIOUNI, supra 
note 26, at 550-52. 
115. See Emami v. District Court, 834 F.2d 1444, 1448 (9th Cir. 1987); In re Extradi-
tion of Assarsson, 687 F.2d 1157, 1057-58 (8th Cir. 1982) (extradition proceedings against 
the brother of the Assarsson who was the subject of the Seventh Circuit opinion); In re 
Extradition of La Salvia, 1986 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 29789, 19-20 (S.D.N.Y.); Republic of 
France v. Moghadam, 617 F.Supp. 777, 781 (N.D. Cal. 1985). 
116. Supplementary Convention of Extradition Between the United States and Swe-
den, Mar. 14, u.S.-Swed., 1983, art. 1,35 U.S.T. 2501 (emphasis added). 
117. See Report on Supplementary Convention on Extradition with Sweden, Senate 
Comm. On Foreign Relations, S. Ex. REPT. No. 98-27, (1984). 
118. See 635 F.2d at 1242. 
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tive detention.119 In June of 1996, an Italian judge for preliminary investiga-
tions (giudice delle indagini preliminari or G.l.P.) issued an order for the 
preventive detention (misura cautelare) of Felice Rovelli and his mother, 
Primarosa Battistella. The order described Rovelli and Battistella as sus-
pects (indagati) in a judicial bribery scheme involving public officials in the 
Tribunale of Rome. Italy relied on the order of preventive detention to sup-
port extradition requests to Switzerland for Battistella, and the United States 
for Rovelli. Switzerland denied the request to extradite Battistella.l20 The 
basis of the preventive detention order was a suspicion that Rovelli and Bat-
tistella had paid $44.6 million in bribes to win a lawsuit which involved the 
father and husband, Nino Rovelli. Rovelli and Battistella had submitted to 
questioning by Italian prosecutors in Switzerland prior to the extradition re-
quests. They told the prosecutors that while on his deathbed, Nino Rovelli 
told them three lawyers would visit them and they were to pay the lawyers. 
After Nino Rovelli's death, the lawyers asked for the money and Rovelli and 
Battistella paid them without asking any questions. Rovelli had been living 
in the United States for fifteen years. 
Some foreign jurisdictions have provisions which allow for a deprivation 
of liberty for extended periods of time in situations where the individual is 
not assured to face trial, and upon expiration of the detention period will be 
released without any resolution of the suspicions.121 Under Italian law, a per-
son who is suspected of committing a crime which is punishable by a mini-
mum sentence of more than four years may be the subject of a prosecutor's 
119. For the discussion of the Rovelli extradition matter, I rely primarily on docu-
ments submitted by the Italian government in support of his extradition. These same 
documents were also relied upon by the United States government before the extradition 
magistrate, Thomas Smith of the United States District Court in Hartford, Connecticut. 
In re Extradition Rovelli, Misc. No. 2:97M38TPS (D. Conn. 1997). 
120. See Mark Pazniokas, Italian Intrigue in a Hartford Jail Cen· Rising Star on Wall 
Street Fights Extradition to Homeland, HARTFORD COURANT, June 7,1997, at AI. 
121. See generally PREVENTIVE DETENTION: A COMPARATIVE AND 
INTERNATIONAL LAW PERSPECIlVE (S. Frankowski & D. Shelton eds. 1992). Recent 
events in the news indicate the use of detention without initiation of criminal proceedings. 
See John Murray Brown, London and Dublin Grapple with the Problem of Rooting Out 
the Real IRA: Both Governments Have Promised New Measures in the Wake of Omagh 
Bomb, THE FINANCIAL TIMES (London), Aug. 18, 1998, at 7 (discussing the use of in-
ternment or detention without trial); Bert Roughton Jr., Loss in N. Ireland Blast 'Cut 
Through All Classes: THE ATLANTA CONST., Aug. 18,1998, at 12A. "Northern Ireland 
anti-terrorist law allows suspects to be detained for questioning for up to one week before 
being charged or released." Id. Following the American Embassy bombings in Kenya and 
Tanzania on August 7, 1998, news reports indicate that suspects were detained without 
charges by officials in Tanzania and in Pakistan. See Dean E. Murphy and Ann M. Sim-
mons, The U.S. Embassy Bombings, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 12, 1998, at A6. "[S]ix Iraqis and 
six Sudanese are among 14 'dubious characters' being detained by police, but the men 
have not been charged with a crime." Id. See Karnran Khan and Pamela Constable, Em-
bassy Bomb Suspect Reportedly Tied Rogue Saudi to Plot, THE BOSTON GLOBE, Aug. 19, 
1998, at AlD. "A Palestinian suspect ... was detained and questioned for a week by Paki-
stani authorities." Id. 
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request for preventive detention in prison.l22 Under the Italian Code of 
Criminal Procedure, the requirements for preventive detention include that 
grave or serious suspicion of gUilt (gravi indizi di colpevolezza) exise23 and 
that one of the following situations be present: 1) a fear that the investiga-
tions could be jeopardized by the tampering or destruction of evidence; 2) a 
fear that the defendant or suspect will flee; or 3) a fear that the defendant or 
suspect will commit a violent crime or a crime similar to the one charged or 
under investigation.l24 Furthermore, in order to impose preventive detention 
in prison, the code requires that all other measures be inadequate.12S This 
device is used to detain persons who have been caught in jlagranza and ar-
rested, pending resolution of the charges filed, as well as those who have 
been convicted at the trial of first instance (giudizio di primo grado ).126 A 
person who is a suspect may also be detained pending the investigation of 
the allegations, before the prosecutor has made a request to bind the person 
over for trial. While the standard is the same, one who has been arrested is 
more certain to face at least a preliminary hearing if not a trial or other pro-
cedure to resolve the matter.127 A suspect who is arrested only for purposes 
of carrying out a preventive detention order cannot be sure that there will be 
a resolution of the criminal allegations of which he is suspected; instead, he 
may simply be released upon the expiration of the period for detention. U.S. 
criminal procedure law has no equivalent to the form of preventive deten-
tion described above. In the United States, once arrested, an individual may 
122. See c.P.P. art. 280(1). Other forms of precautionary measures include house 
arrest (C.P.P. art. 284), prohibition on travel outside the country (C.P.P. art. 281), and a 
requirement that the individual report to a specific police office on specific days at certain 
times (C.P.P. art. 282). 
123. See c.P.P. art. 273 (1). 
124. See c.P.P. art. 274. 
125. See c.P.P. art. 275(3). See supra note 122 for other precautionary measures. 
126. Under Italian law a conviction is not considered final until the trial of third in-
stance. See Rachel A. Van Cleave, Italy, in CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: A WORLDWIDE 
SURVEY (Craig M. Bradley ed., forthcoming, 1999) (manuscript at 61, on file with author); 
ANIELLO NAPPI, GUIDA AL CODICE DI PROCEDURA PENALE 665 (6th ed. 1997) [Guide 
to the Criminal Procedure Code). See also Alessandra Stanley, 3-Step Justice System: 
Conviction, Appeal, Escape, N.Y. nMES, May 23, 1998, at A4 (quipping that the Italian 
system allows many to avoid serving sentences by escaping while their conviction is re-
viewed by the courts of second and third instance). Under Italian law, however, the pro-
cedure for imposing preventive detention pending an investigation may also be used to 
detain an individual who has been convicted in the trial of the first instance, pending re-
view. 
127. For descriptions of alternatives to trials for resolving criminal cases created by 
the 1989 Italian Code of Criminal Procedure, see Rachel A. Van Cleave, An Offer You 
Can't Refuse? Punishment Without Trial in Italy and the United States: The Search for 
Truth and an Efficient Criminal Justice System, 11 EMORY INT'L L. REv. 419 (1997); Wil-
liam T. Pizzi and Luca Marafioti, The New Italian Code of Criminal Procedure: The Diffi-
culties of Building an Adversarial Trial System on a Civil Law Foundation, 17 YALE J. 
INT'L L. 1 (1992); Jeffery J. Miller, Plea Bargaining and Its Analogues Under the New Ital-
ian Criminal Procedure Code and in the United States: Towards a New Understanding of 
Comparative Criminal Procedure, 22 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 215 (1990). 
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be detained without bail pending a judicial decision to bind the individual 
over for trial. This process occurs after a preliminary hearing or the issuance 
of an indictment by a grand jury.l28 Since there is no U.S. equivalent to this 
mechanism, it is important for federal courts to consider the nature of the 
order issued by the country seeking extradition of a person in the United 
States. 
The federal court in the Rovelli case should have considered the signifi-
cance of the order of preventive detention in connection with another impor-
tant difference between the United States and Italian criminal justice sys-
tems. The Italian Code of Criminal Procedure makes an express distinction 
between suspects and defendants. l29 The term used for a defendant is impu-
tato, which is a form of the noun imputazione, which means charge, indict-
ment, or information.l30 An individual does not become an imputato until 
the prosecutor has charged him with a crime in a request of committal, or 
binding over, for trial.\31 The term imputato is in contrast to the term for sus-
pect, or person under investigation (indagato or persona sottoposta aile inda-
gini).\32 This distinction is significant and not merely a matter of semantics.\33 
The Italian criminal justice system uses these two terms to distinguish be-
tween the investigatory stage and the initiation of criminal proceedings (pro-
cedimento ).134 The investigatory phase begins when the police have received 
notice of a crime (notizia del reato),135 and ends with either the prosecutor's 
initiation of criminal proceedings by a request of remand for trial (rinvio a 
giudizio),I36 or a request to dismiss the case (archiviazione).137 The support-
ing documents submitted by the Italian government for Rovelli's extradition 
illustrate the significance of these differences. The order issued by the judge 
for preliminary investigations (giudice pre Ie indagini preliminari)/38 is enti-
tled "Order on the Application of Preventive Detention" (Ordinanza di Ap-
128. See ALLEN, supra note 22, at 12-15; but see supra note 25 (discussing other forms 
of detention in the United States). 
129. See Van Cleave, supra note 126, at 31-32. 
130. See FRANCESCO DE FRANCHIS, DIZIONARIO GIURIDICO 873 (2nd ed., 1996). 
131. See c.P.P. art. 60; FRANCHIS, supra note 130, at 1247 (defining rinvio a giudizio 
as "committal for trial"). 
132. See c.P.P. art. 61(1) (guaranteeing the suspect the same rights as the imputato or 
person charged). See also FRANcHIs, supra note 130, at 880 (defining indagato as indicted 
person, but explaining, in Italian, that there really is no equivalent term under the com-
mon law, and giving as the best definition "the condition of a suspected person in the stage 
of judicial investigation before a formal request for prosecution is made"). 
133. See supra note 93, citing Assarsson, 635 F.2d at 1243. 
134. See FRANCHIS, supra note 130, at 1125 (lamenting the difficulty of translating 
the termprocedimento into an equivalent under the common law). 
135. See C.P.P. art 330; NAPPI, supra note 126, at 22. 
136. See C.P.P. art 405(1). 
137. See c.P.P. art. 408(1). See also FRANCHIS, supra note 130, at 389. Archiviazione 
literally means to file away in the archives. See NAPPI, supra note 126, at 22. 
138. See c.P.P. art. 328. 
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plicazione di Misura Cautelare),139 and repeatedly refers to Rovelli as inda-
gato, or suspect.140 While the order speaks of charges, it qualifies these as 
preliminary, or tentative charges (imputazione preliminare).141 While the fact 
that Rovelli had not been committed or remanded for trial may not be 
enough to preclude extradition under the treaty, when that fact is coupled 
with the fact that under the Italian mechanism of preventive detention, he 
would not necessarily have the allegations against him resolved, a U.S. fed-
eral court should not permit extradition. 
The Italian code provides that preventive detention for evidentiary 
needs is limited to thirty days,142 unless the investigations are particularly 
complex or several persons are under investigation for the offense, in which 
case the initial period of detention is three months to one year, depending 
upon the sentence prescribed for the suspected offense. 143 In addition, if the 
investigations are particularly complex, the term may be extended for up to 
one-half of the term described above. 144 Thus, depending upon the offense 
suspected, one may be held for up to eighteen months in prison during the 
investigation, pending a decision by the prosecutor of whether to initiate 
criminal proceedings by requesting that the suspect be bound over for trial 
(rinvio a giudizio). Upon the expiration of the detention term, there is no 
dismissal (archiviazione), but rather a judicial order to release the person. 
The district court judge in the Rovelli case did not grasp this key distinction. 
While in the United States a suspect might be detained pending an indict-
ment, it is clear upon arrest that the prosecutor will seek an indictment 
within a short period of time.145 Under Italian law, the order for preventive 
detention permits authorities to hold the suspect even where there is not 
necessarily a prospect that the suspect will go before a judge at a preliminary 
hearing at which the prosecutor will either request that the suspect be bound· 
over for trial, or that the charges be dismissed. Rather, without citation or 
analysis, the judge in Rovelli concluded that the "arrest warrant issued by the 
Italian authorities constitutes a charging document under Italian law.,,146 
Even though the opinion pertained only to the issue of bail, it is significant 
for what it lacks in reasoning and support. In the end, Rovelli spent six 
months in an Italian prison, never facing the prospect of a trial or other pro-
ceeding to resolve any suspicions.147 Therefore, whether a federal judge 
139. See Order of Alessandro Rossato, Feb. 13, 1997, Tribunale di Milano (copy on 
file with author). 
140. Seeid. at4,26,27, 62, 71. 
141. See id. at 70. 
142. See c.P.P. art. 301(2bis). 
143. See c.P.P. art. 303(1)(a 1-3). 
144. See C.P.P. art. 305(2). 
145. See supra note 22. 
146. 977 F.Supp. 566, 568 (D.C. Conn. 1997). 
147. Ultimately, he was released because the Supreme Court determined that the 
judge for preliminary investigations had erroneously held that Rovelli presented a risk of 
flight. Telephone interview with Robert A. Culp in New York, N.Y. (May 20,1998). 
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comprehends another country's criminal justice system sufficiently to know 
whether the treaty requirements are satisfied can have a significant impact 
on the person who is the subject of the extradition request. l48 A federal court 
should engage in an examination of another country's criminal justice system 
similar to that above in the context of interpreting the relevant provisions of 
the extradition treaty with that country. Generally speaking, courts should 
interpret treaties "in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to 
the terms of the agreement in their context and in the light of its objects and 
purpose. ,,149 
It is clear that given the differences between the United States and Ital-
ian criminal justice systems, the term charged does not have an ordinary 
meaning. The Italian language version of the extradition treaty with Italy 
sheds minimal light on this issue. It states that the parties agree to extradite 
"Ie persone che siano perseguite 0 che siano state condannate, ,,150 which 
translates to "persons who are being prosecuted or have been convicted." 
The Italian version does not use any of the terms described earlier which 
mean either suspect (indagato) or charged (imputato). This is most likely 
due to the fact that the Italian Code of Criminal Procedure was completely 
rewritten in 1989, six years after the treaty was signed. 
Aside from the terms of the treaty, another important source for dis-
cerning the intent of the parties is the drafting history of the document, as 
well as any other agreements between the two countries.15I Interestingly, the 
extradition treaty between the United States and Italy was reported favora-
bly by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on June 20, 1984,152 the very 
same day on which the same committee favorably reported the Supplemen-
tary Convention on Extradition with Sweden.153 As discussed earlier, the 
supplementary convention with Sweden replaced language in the extradition 
treaty stating that the person sought be "charged," with language that such 
person be "sought for the purpose of prosecution.,,154 The fact that language 
in the treaty with Italy was not broadened consistently with the treaty with 
Sweden indicates that the requirement that the relator be charged is not sat-
isfied by an order of preventive detention.155 
148. Rovelli was away from his American wife and their two young children. 
149. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES 
§ 329(1) (1980). 
150. Treaty of Extradition between United States and Italy, Oct. 13, 1983, U.S.-Italy, 
art. I, 35 U.S.T. 3023, 3044. 
151. See BASSIOUNI, supra note 26, at 82. 
152. See Report on Extradition Treaty with Italy, Senate Comm. On Foreign Rela-
tions, S. Ex. Rept. No. 98-33, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. (June 20, 1984). 
153. See Report on Supplementary Convention on Extradition with Sweden, Senate 
Comm. On Foreign Relations, S. Ex. Rept. No. 98-27, 98th Cong., 2d Sess., at p.3 (June 20, 
1984). 
154. See supra notes 116-17 and accompanying text. 
155. The interpretation suggested in the text could certainly be criticized as unduly 
narrow. See Martin A. Rogoff, Interpretation of International Agreements by Domestic 
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In addition, if the Italian government wanted to obtain evidence from 
Rovelli, it could have proceeded under the Treaty with the Italian Republic 
on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters.l56 Under this treaty, the two 
countries agree to assist each other in criminal investigations and proceed-
ing,157 in a number of ways, including taking the testimony of "[a] person 
from whom evidence is sought."ls8 Thus, an extradition request was not the 
only form of cooperation Italy could have sought, and in construing a treaty 
requirement that the requested person be charged, courts should consider 
the existence of other alternatives, especially where the relator is sought pur-
suant to an order for preventive detention.159 In the Amaboldi case, dis-
cussed below, after the magistrate declined to hold the relator without bail 
because Italy relied on an order of preventive detention for extradition, an 
Italian judge came to the United States and questioned Arnaboldi.l60 While 
each extradition treaty the United States has with other countries has its own 
particularities, analysis of the U.S.-Italy treaty is illustrative of the necessity 
to understand not only the treaty language, but the context of the court sys-
tem of the requesting country. 
V. GLIMMERS OF UNDERSTANDING 
There are a few indications that some federal courts are beginning to 
understand the difference between an arrest warrant for pending charges 
and an arrest warrant for preventive detention. In In re Extradition of La 
Salvia,l6l the district court accepted affidavits from experts on the criminal 
Courts and the Politics of International Treaty Relations: Reflections on Some Recent Deci-
sions of the United States Supreme Court, 11 AM. U. J. INT'L L. & POL'y 559 (1996) 
(pointing to a trend of unduly narrow interpretation of treaties by the U.S. Supreme 
Court). However, in the context of extradition "to err in the liberality of interpreting ex-
tradition treaties is in fact to place individuals in greater jeopardy of their lives and liber-
ties." BASSIOUNI, supra note 26, at 90 (comparing the effects of liberal interpretation of 
treaties of commerce and navigation with the effects in extradition). But see Rogoff, supra 
at 583-92 (criticizing the narrow interpretation given the extradition treaty with Mexico in 
United States v. A1varez-Machain, 504 U.S. 655 (1992), which held that the United States 
did not violate the treaty when U.S. drug enforcement agents participated in the kidnap-
ping of a suspect from his home in Mexico in order to bring him before a judge in the 
United States). 
156. See Message from The President of the United States, June 11, 1984, U.S.-Italian 
Republic, TREATY Doc. No. 98-25 (1984). 
157. See id. art. 1. 
158. Id. arts. 14 and 15. 
159. See Report on Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty with Italy, June 20, 1984, U.S.-
Italian Republic, S. EXEC. REp. No. 98-36, at 11-12 (1984). "The United States has long 
been able to extradite fugitives ... to foreign countries. However, prior to this Treaty, it 
has not had the authority to take the far less intrusive step of seeking its courts ... to com-
pel the appearance of a witness .... " Id. 
160. Telephone Interview with Sharon Kegerreis, Attorney, Zucker, Spader, et a!., in 
Miami, FL (May 22, 1998). 
161. 1986 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 29789, 20 (S.D.N.Y.). 
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justice system of Argentina. The arrest warrant issued by the Argentine 
judge stated that the requirements for preventive detention were satisfied.162 
The relator argued that an arrest warrant for preventive detention was not 
equivalent to being charged as required by the extradition treaty.l63 Based 
on the uncontroverted evidence in the affidavit of the government's expert 
witness,l64 the court determined that under Argentine law an order for pre-
ventive detention could be issued only as to a person who has been charged. 
Therefore, the relator would simply be subjected to pre-trial, rather than 
pre-charge, detention.l6S The court in La Salvia initially cited to Assarsson, 
stating that the term charge was intended to have a generic meaning. l66 How-
ever, the court then went on to consider the detailed affidavit of the govern-
ment's expert on Argentine criminal procedure, which analyzed the different 
terms used, similar to the analysis above of Italian criminal procedure. 167 The 
analysis in this opinion recognized a difference between detention after the 
filing of charges while the accused awaits trial, and detention pending the 
completion of the investigation and either the filing of charges or the release 
of the suspect. It is significant that the court did not eschew any examination 
of Argentine criminal proceedings by claiming a lack of expertise as the 
court in Assarsson did. 
The distinction between pre-charge detention and pre-trial detention 
was also llnplicitly acknowledged in In re Extradition of Moglia. l68 Moglia 
had initially been found in Australia, and Italy had requested his extradition 
from that country. However, the Australian court denied the request, find-
ing that the arrest warrant for Moglia "was for investigative purposes only 
and that Moglia had not in fact been 'charged' within the meaning of the 
treaty."I69 When Moglia raised this same argument to the U.S. extradition 
magistrate, the court rejected it because the Italian prosecutor had subse-
quently requested Moglia's commitment for trial. The court stated, "[t]here 
is no dispute that under Italian law once a prosecutor asks the court for a 
person's commitment for trial, that person has been 'charged' within the 
meaning of the treaty.,,170 While the court in Moglia did not directly confront 
162. See id. at 21. 
163. See Treaty of Extradition Between the United States and Argentina, Jan. 21, 
1972, art. I, 23 U.S.T. 3504 (authorizing extradition of "persons ... who have been charged 
with or convicted"). 
164. Unfortunately, the court completely discounted the affidavit of the realtor's ex-
pert due to its conclusory nature. See id. I think the lesson for lawyers representing per-
sons on extradition matters is obvious. 
165. See id. at 23-24. 
166. See id. at 17. 
167. See id. at 21-22 (examining the meaning of terms such as procesarmiento and 
procesada and finding that they refer to the" charging process and one who has been 
charged). 
168. 813 F.Supp. 1438 (D. Haw. 1993). 
169. Id. at 1440. 
170. Id. 
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the distinction between charged and under suspicion, the opinion indicates 
some initial understanding of the difference argued in this paper. In addi-
tion, the court did not dismiss the issue as a matter beyond the scope of re-
view by a federal court. 
Finally, in In re Extradition of Amaboldi,171 at the bail hearingtn follow-
ing Arnaboldi's arrest, the magistrate granted the relator's release on bail 
pending the extradition hearing. The court relied on Arnaboldi's argument 
that the Italian arrest warrant was an order for preventive detention while 
the Italian authorities investigated the suspected crimes, and therefore Arn-
aboldi was not a person charged for purposes of the extradition treaty.173 
This order, while only relating to the issue of release pending the extradition 
hearing, expresses the clearest understanding by a U.S. court of the differ-
ence asserted in this paper. The magistrate found "sufficient reason to ques-
tion whether [the relator] faces the criminal charges listed in the extradition 
complaint; or is simply wanted for questioning as part of an ongoing criminal 
investigation.,,174 Based on this concern, the magistrate granted the relator's 
request to be released on bail pending the extradition hearing. Subse-
quently, an Italian judge went to Florida and questioned Arnaboldi.175 
These examples of courts attempting to understand aspects of another 
system are imperative to ensure that the terms of the treaty are actually sat-
isfied. Furthermore, such efforts at understanding do not violate the rule of 
non-inquiry, because the issue of charged is within the initial prong of the 
analysis, and because the court does not engage in an evaluation or judgment 
of the foreign system, but rather seeks to comprehend it. Nor did the courts 
in La Salvia, Moglia, and Amaboldi fold concerns relating to non-inquiry 
into their interpretation of the word charged in the relevant treaties. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
The initial decision by the House of Lords in the extradition matter of 
Pinochet examined international law as part of its analysis of the issue of 
immunity.176 The decision by Spain's National Court affirming Spain's juris-
diction over Pinochet was hailed as a "landmark ruling based on interna-
tional law."m These events illustrate a recognition of the important role 
171. No. 95-2467 (S.D. Fla. 1995) (Bandstra, Magistrate Judge). 
172. See Wright v. Henkel, 190 U.S. 40, 63 (1903) ("bail should not ordinarily be 
granted in cases of foreign extradition"); Jeffery A. Hall, Recommended Approach to Bail 
in International Extradition Cases, 86 MICH. L. REv. 599 (1987). 
173. See Arnaboldi, No. 95-2467 at 4. 
174. Arnaboldi, No. 95-2467 at 3. 
175. See Kegerreis Telephone Interview, supra note 160. 
176. See supra notes 5-11 and accompanying text. 
177. See Marlise Simons, Judges in Spain Assert Pinochet Can Face Trial, N.Y. TIMES, 
Oct. 30, 1998, at Al. See also Ray Suarez, Talk of the Nation (National Public Radio 
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domestic courts play in the arena of international law generally, and extradi-
tion, specifically. In the context of extradition, U.S. federal courts should at-
tempt to understand the criminal justice systems of other countries for the 
practical purpose of ensuring that the requesting countries adhere to the 
terms of the treaty. Examining the criminal proceedings of the requesting 
country to determine that the relator has been charged does not involve, 
much less violate, the doctrine of non-inquiry, and courts should not eschew 
such an analysis. This, of course, means that the burden of providing federal 
courts with such evidence falls on the attorneys. 
Broadcast, Dec. 14, 1998, Transcript No. 98121402-211 [Interview with Ruth Wedgwood, 
Professor of Law, Yale University Law School] discussing the implications of the Spanish 
precedent on the issue of universal jurisdiction). 
